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MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
ADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE OBTAINED
BY WIRE TAPPING
Hitzelberger v. State'
The appellant was indicted by the grand jury of Bal-
timore City for malfeasance in office. The indictment con-
tained several counts, charging that while a member of
the police force of said city, the appellant permitted, con-
nived at and allowed several named persons to conduct
houses of prostitution. Testimony was adduced by the
state, through the production of one of the federal agents
who made the vice investigations, to, the effect that in the
course of the investigation he tapped telephone wires con-
nected with one of the disorderly houses, over which he
intercepted communications between the appellant, the
proprietor, and one of the inmates of the house. These
communications were reduced to writing at the respective
times at which they were intercepted, and kept by the in-
vestigator in the form of two volumes. On cross exami-
nation the appellant admitted many calls to the specified
house.
The principal question involved for present purposes
is, did the court err in admitting evidence of the telephone
conversations intercepted by wire tapping? Held: Affirmed.
In recent years this question has been the subject of
many interesting opinions found in the reports, of the
Supreme Court of the United States and the appellate
courts of many States of the Union.
The common law rule is that the admissibility of evi-
dence is not affected by the illegality of the means by
which it is obtained.2  This unbending rule of law must be
considered in connection with the search and seizure and
self-incrimination provisions of the Federal and Maryland
constitutions.3
" 174 Md. 152, 197 A. 605 (1938). See also Rowan et al. vs. State, 3 A.
(2nd) 753 (Md. 1939), a case incidentally involving the use of evidence
obtained by wire tapping, and holding that, had the witness been able to
identify the voice (for lack of which the evidence was inadmissible), the
evidence would not have been inadmissible, because the Federal Commu-
nications Act cannot limit the admissibility of evidence In State courts.
2 Lawrence v. State, 103 Md. 17, 63 A. 96 (1906; Meisinger v. State, 155
Md. 195; 141 A. 536 (1928) ; Richardson v. State, 141 A. 538 (Md. 1928).
3 U. S. Const., Amendment IV, provides: "The right of the people to be
secure in their persons, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches
and seizures shall not be violated .. ." Ibid, Amendment V, "No person
shall be compelled, in any criminal case, to be a witness against himself".
See also Maryland Declaration of Rights, Articles 22, 26.
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The Boyd case" laid down for the first time the prin-
ciple that evidence gathered illegally by Federal officers
was inadmissible because contrary to the Fourth Amend-
ment. Dean Wigmore has repeatedly denounced this "mis-
guided sentimentality" on the part of the Federal courts.'
Regardless of this criticism the Supreme Court in succeed-
ing cases has consistently adhered to the principle enun-
ciated above. The Court faltered somewhat in Adams v.
New York,6 but checked itself in a vigorous opinion in the
leading case of Weeks v. United States.7 These cases were
followed and sustained in Silverthorne Lumber Co. v.
United States,8 and Gouled v. United States.'
Since 1914 various state courts have approved and ac-
cepted the principle laid down in the Weeks case, until at
present eighteen States follow the Federal rule of inad-
missibility and twenty-six the rule of admissibility. 10
The case of Olmstead v. United States" was the first
case calling for a direct holding as to whether or not the
gathering of incriminating evidence by Federal officers, by
tapping private telephone wires, was a violation of the
Constitution of the United States. By a 5-4 decision the
Court held it was not. This is apparently the first case
which ever distinctly presented the question as to what is
a search. It is also one of the few which has considered
how much of the realm of privacy, in the light of modern
conditions, the phrase "persons, houses, papers, and ef-
fects", encompasses and renders inviolable. Before the
Olmstead case the nearest approach to, a declaration that
wire tapping violated the Fourth Amendment was in the
case of United States v. James,2 in which it was said:
"Then too, if the immunity was only against law
inflicted pains and penalties, the government could
probe the secrets, of every conversation".
The Supreme Court in its opinion in the Olmstead case
arbitrarily decided that there is no analogy between tele-
'Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 616, 29 L. Ed. 746, 6 S. C. 524 (1886).
Wigmore, Evidence (Second Edition 1923) Sec. 2183.8192 U. S. 585, 48 L. Ed. 575, 24 S. C. 372 (1904).
1232 U. S. 383, 58 L. Ed. 652, 34 S. C. 341 (1914).
'251 U. S. 385, 64 L. Ed. 319, 40 S. C. 182 (1920).
'255 U. S. 298, 65 L. Ed. 647, 41 S. C. 261 (1921).
10 See Wigmore, Evidence (Second Edition 1923) Secs. 2183, 2184; and
annotations, 24 A. L. R. 1408, 32 A. L. R. 408, 41 A. L. R. 1145, 52 A. L. R.
477, and 88 A. L. R. 348.
11277 U. S. 438, 72 L. Pd. 944, 48 Sup. Ct. 564 (1928).
1260 Fed. 257 (1894).
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phone conversations and a letter. Mr. Chief Justice Taft
said:
"The United States takes no such care of telephone
and telegraph messages as of mailed sealed letters.
The Amendment does not forbid what was, done here.
There was no searching. There- was no seizure. The
evidence was secured by the use of the sense of hear-
ing and that only. The language of the amendment
cannot be extended and expanded to include telephone
wires, reaching to the whole world from the defend-
ant's house or office".
Opening a letter taken from the mails is illegal, and
evidence thereby obtained is inadmissible.1 8 Similarly, pri-
vate papers taken by stealth or fraud will not be admit-
ted."4 Yet evidence procured by immoral conduct on the
part of an officer is admissible.15
Contumely and opprobrium have been heaped upon un-
ethical methods of crime detection. Unethical wire tapping
is the subject of criminal statutes in twenty-six states, and
in thirty-four, including Maryland,"6 it is a criminal offence
for a telephone or -telegraph company, or its employees, to
disclose, or to assist in disclosing any messages.
As to whether evidence obtained illegally should be
admissible, the leading authorities have laid down two
views. The first is that civil liberties should be protected
as guaranteed by the Federal Constitution, and the sec-
ond is that criminals! should be prosecuted for their wrongs
against society. One of the leading cases expressing the
former view is Youman v. Comm., 7 where it was said:
"It seems to us that a practice like this (admissi-
bility of illegally obtained evidence) would do infinitely
more harm than good in the administration of jus-
tice; that it would create in the minds of the people
the belief that courts had no respect for the Consti-
tution or laws, when respect interferes with the ends
desired to be accomplished. We cannot give our ap-
proval to a practice like this. It is much better that
a guilty individual should escape punishment than
that a court of justice should put aside a vital funda-
18 Ex Parte Jackson, 96 U. S. 727, 24 L. Ed. 877 (1878).
1, Gouled v. U. S., 255 U. S. 298, 65 L. Ed. 647, 41 S. C. 261 (1921).
1 5 U. S. v. Lee Hee, 60 F. (2nd) 924 (C. C. A. 2d 1932).
l8Md. Code, Art. 27, Sec. 489.
17189 Ky. 152, 224 S. W. 860 (1920).
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mental principle of the law in order to secure his con-
viction. In the exercise of their great powers, courts
have no higher duty to perform than those involving
the protection of the citizen in the civil rights guar-
anteed to him by the Constitution, and if at any time
the protection of these rights should delay, or even
defeat, the ends of justice in a particular case, it is
better for the public good that this should happen than
that a great constitutional mandate should be nullified.
It is, trifling with the importance of the question to
say, as, some courts have said, that the injured party
has his cause of action against the officer, and this
should be sufficient satisfaction."
Among the best judicial expositions of the orthodox
view, the following language stands out in People v.
Mayen:8
"The Constitution and the laws of the land are not
solicitous to aid persons charged with crime in their
efforts to conceal or sequester evidence of their ini-
quity. From the necessity of the case the law counten-
ances many devious methods of procuring evidence in
criminal cases. The whole system of espionage rests
largely upon deceiving and trapping the wrongdoer
into some involuntary disclosure of his crime. It dis-
simulates a way into his confidence; it listens at the
key-hole and peers through the transom light. It is
not nice, but it is necessary in ferreting out the crimes
against society which are always, done in darkness and
concealment. Thus it is that almost from time imme-
morial courts engaged in the trial of a criminal pro-
secution have accepted competent and relevant evi-
dence without question, and have refused to collater-
ally investigate the source or manner of its procure-
ment, leaving the parties aggrieved to whatever di-
rect remedies the law provides".
Since the decision in the Olmstead case, Congress has
enacted what is known as the Federal Communication Act. 9
This provides:
"No person receiving or assisting in receiving, or
transmitting, or assisting in transmitting, any inter-
is 188 Cal. 237, 205 Pac. 435 (1922).
47 U. S. C. A., Sec. 605.
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state or foreign communication by wire or radio shall
divulge or publish the existence, contents, substance,
purport, effect, or meaning thereof, except through
authorized channels, of transmission or reception, to
any person other than the addressee, his agent or at-
torney, or in response to a subpoena issued by a court
of competent jurisdiction, or on demand of other law-
ful authority; and no person not being authorized by
the sender, shall intercept any communication and di-
vulge or publish the existence, contents, substance,
purport, effect or meaning of such intercepted com-
munication to any person".
Subsequently to the enactment of this Federal Statute
the case of Nardone v. United States ° arose. The question
involved was whether, in view of the provisions of this act,
evidence procured by Federal officers tapping telephone
wires and intercepting messages is admissible in a criminal
trial in a United States District Court. It was held that
the evidence is inadmissible, because the word "person" in
the act comprehends Federal agents engaged in the detec-
tion of a crime. Thus the Supreme Court has decided that
the Communications Act does expressly bar the use of the
illegally obtained message as evidence, even though such
exclusion is nowhere to be found in express terms within
the act. It appears that the merits of wire tapping must
have been considered by the Court in reaching its decision,
and that its views on the constitutional and moral consid-
eration have changed since the Olmstead case, which up-
held the constitutionality of wire tapping, and sustained,
on common law principles, the admission of evidence so
procured. It is suggested that the Olmstead case might
be overruled if the question came up today on an intra-
state message, not covered by statute. Already the lower
Federal courts have begun to limit the decision to inter-
state messages and to allow interrupted intra-state mes-
sages to be put in evidence.21
The Nardone case will probably not hinder law officers
to a great extent if evidence uncovered by means of in-
admissible conversations is admitted. Such evidence should
be admitted by analogy to the admissions of facts discov-
ered on the basis of an inadmissible confession."
20 302 U. S. 379, 82 L. Ed. 314, 58 S. C. 275 (1937).
21 See New York Times, January 12, 1934, p. 13.
21 Wigmore, Evidence (Second Edition 1923) Sec. 859.
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Doubtless the same attitude which underlies the Fourth
and Fifth Amendments to the Federal Constitution led to
the enactment of the Maryland statute known as the Bouse
Act.23 This provides:
"No evidence in the trial of misdemeanors shall be
deemed admissible when the same shall have been pro-
cured by, through, or in consequence of any illegal
search or seizure, or of any search and seizure pro-
hibited by the Declaration of Rights of this State; nor
shall any evidence in such cases be admissible if pro-
cured by, through or in consequence of a search and
seizure, the effect of the admission of which would be
to compel one to give evidence against himself in a
criminal case".
While, therefore, before the passage of the above act,
evidence obtained or secured by virtue of an illegal search,
with or without warrant, otherwise admissible, was per-
mitted in this state, it follows that since the passage of
the act, such evidence in cases of misdemeanor is no longer
admissible. In the instant case the Court of Appeals stated
that the evidence procured is not inadmissible under the
statute for the obvious reason that the statute makes. no
reference to the interception of wire communications. 24
REQUIREMENT OF DELIVERY IN GIFTS
OF PERSONALTY
Schenker v. Moodhel
Plaintiff-appellee brought this bill in equity against the
administrator of the estate of one Coleman, to compel the
surrender of property alleged to have been given her by the
decedent. Plaintiff had assisted the decedent on several
occasions before his last illness, and the decedent had ex-
pressed an intention to reward her. When the decedent
realized that death was imminent, he told the plaintiff that
he had purchased a cemetery lot and that she would find a
23 Md. Code Supp., Art. 35, Sec. 4 A.
21 For a treatment of the Bouse Act generally, see Note, Admi8sibility
of Evidence Obtained by Unlawful Search and Seizure (1938) 2 Md. L.
Rev. 147.
1 200 A. 727 (Md. 1938). For the same litigation, on a separate bill of
complaint and appeal, see Moodhe v. Schenker, 4 A. (2nd) 453 (Md. 1939).
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